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Introduction   The purpose of this paper is to provide two arguments against David Gauthier’s version of contractarianism.  The purpose of these two arguments is to weaken the cumulative case for this view.  Contractarianism, in brief, attempts to offer us a theory of morals by agreement.  This theory provides answers to the following questions.  Which moral claims are we justified in making?  Why are these claims justified?   Drawing on the Hobbesian tradition, persons are seen as primarily disposed to pursue their own interests.  Thus, any moral claims that inhibit these interests must be justified.  Gauthier’s test for justified moral claims comes in the form of an agreement.  Justified moral claims are those that self‐interested persons would accept.  Thus, the agreement is hypothetical and not actual, or historical.  But the parties to the agreement are actual persons.   Not all of our existing moral claims pass this test; a good many of our moral claims fail it and are, consequently, unjustified.  But despite this fact, we still have a good reason to comply with justified moral claims:  it makes us better off.  By agreeing to constrain some of our interests, rather than not agreeing to constrain any of them, we are able to gain the benefits of cooperation with others.  These benefits are available only to those who so cooperate.  So, the two questions are answered.  Which moral claims are we justified in making?  Those claims that self‐interested persons would agree upon.  Why are these claims justified?  Because they make available benefits otherwise unavailable to us.  We are, then, provided with a theory of 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morality:  morals by agreement.  All of this will be fleshed out in a fair amount of detail in the first section.     The first argument of the present paper is as follows.  According to Gauthier, if, upon making this hypothetical agreement, we come to realize that the terms of the agreement itself rely on a conception of morality that is not the object of agreement, we will come to view the agreement as tainted, or unstable.1  To re‐establish the agreement on more stable grounds, each party to it will, he supposes, consider which moral claims each would accept in a pre‐moral, pre‐social situation.  The agreement, since it then proceeds from a situation that escapes prior influence of any moral conception, will be a purer, or more stable, test for morality.     I will argue that were we to engage in this task of imagining ourselves in such a situation, the resulting imagined person would be quite foreign to ourselves.  This hypothetical person, then, is the party to the agreement.  The constraints that she would choose in such a situation then appear irrelevant to us.  Since these constraints form the object of the agreement, then the hypothetical agreement itself is irrelevant to us.  Thus, contractarianism lacks the resources to provide the agreement with the stability that Gauthier insists is needed in order to justify morality.   The second argument responds to a thesis of Gauthier’s that morality faces a foundational crisis and that contractarianism is the only plausible 
                                                        1 This term is Gauthier’s, and it will be explained in due course. 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 Western society can be represented well as a cooperative venture.  It has discovered, he says, how individuals (each in the pursuit of her own interests) work for mutual benefit.  If we consider the vast quantity of material goods, the ever‐increasing lifespan of individuals, and the overall level of well‐being of individuals (to name just some of the benefits), we can see what has resulted from this discovery.20  However, perhaps too much credit has been given to the idealization of the market in the attainment of these goods, and not enough credit given to the role of cooperation.  If this is correct, Gauthier says, then contractarianism is able to express the concern that we do in fact all have in maintaining the conditions necessary to make possible these and further benefits.   Changing technologies have enhanced the well‐being of certain persons who contribute little (or not at all) to the mutual benefit of society.  Only those who contribute can be parties to the agreement.  Thus, not all persons (for example, the handicapped) are parties to the agreement.  Intuitively, all persons should be participants in an agreement that justifies moral claims that apply to all of us.  On Gauthier’s theory, however, not all people are such participants.  This is a weakness, he admits.   Despite these weaknesses however, Gauthier holds that morals by agreement is sufficient to explain why we ought to be moral: it serves our self‐interest to comply with constraints that have been arrived at through a hypothetical agreement.  It provides a reason for all of us to be moral.                                                           20 Ibid.  p. 18. 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prior set of practices, which themselves are not products of agreement.  This fact must call into question the rationality of the agreed‐upon practices.  For if a practice is rational so long as it would receive agreement, and the terms of the agreement are tainted (or considered to be unstable) by existing moral practices, we have reason to say that the agreement is impure.  The agreement then seems arbitrary as well.  “The arbitrariness of existing practices must infect any agreement whose terms are significantly affected by them.”23   While rational agreement is a source of stability, the stability of it is undermined by the circumstances in which it takes place, if such circumstances are arbitrary.  To get around this arbitrariness, individuals will be led to move from considering the agreement as actual to considering it as a hypothetical agreement.  Individuals will consider which practices they would have agreed to from a position not influenced by existing practices.  Such a position is purely rational.  From this pre‐moral, pre‐social context, the agreement regains its stability.    Stability is what links agreement to compliance.  A stable agreement gives us a clearer reason to be moral.   2.2   Central to Gauthier’s recently presented argument is the assumption that imagining ourselves in a pre‐moral, pre‐social context is a possible task.  
                                                        23 Ibid. p. 28. 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It is not.  I will seek to make this claim plausible.  Then, I will explain its implications for Gauthier.      A central part of our self‐conception consists in the roles that we play.24  We are all sons or daughters; many of us are parents, brothers, sisters, friends, and colleagues.  Some roles are chosen reluctantly, others willingly; still other roles are not chosen at all.  We have a real choice of whether to play the role of friend to a person.  We may not like one of our co‐workers, yet we willingly choose to play a role in the story of our co‐workers, since we value our continued employment, and thus, we must continue to interact with this disliked co‐worker.   Each role is a part of the narrative of some person or persons.  We all play one, or several, main or supporting roles in a network of interrelated stories.  The importance of our roles to the story of which they are a part is of course contingent on the narrator(s) of each story.     Some roles are partially defined by certain actions we perform.  I make a purchase at a convenience store; I play the role of a customer of that store—at least for one visit.  I have a minor role in the story of that convenience store.  I ride the train; I play the role of a commuter.  Once again, I play a miniscule role in the story of public transit.  I play a slightly larger role in the story of public transit in my region.  I play a still larger role in the story of the particular train on which I am riding.  Note that in these                                                         24 I am indebted for much of these thoughts to Alisdair MacIntyre, see After Virtue.  Notre Dame, IN:  Notre Dame University Press, 1981.  See especially chapter fifteen. While I credit him for much of the stimulation of these concepts, they have been extended in the present paper. 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 Now, if I were to ask this imagined person, abstracted of all conception of roles, practices and constraints, to choose which set of constraints would serve his self‐interest, any answer provided seems irrelevant to that set of constraints that would serve my self‐interest, since this person is sufficiently foreign to me.  Moreover, since this chosen set of constraints forms the content of the hypothetical agreement, it too loses its relevance to me.   In short, abstracting away from our self‐conception in the way that Gauthier asks of us leads each of us to an imagined person.  Since this person’s choice of constraints forms the basis of the hypothetical agreement, and his choices are irrelevant to each of us, the agreement itself is irrelevant to each of us.  Moreover, since the agreement is irrelevant, and it is supposed to provide a reason for each of us to be moral, it turns out that whatever reason is suggested in this regard is irrelevant to us as well.  Gauthier’s morals by agreement turns out to be irrelevant to our individual lives.  2.3     A contractarian might object at this point.  I am assuming, he might object, that it is impossible to conceive of ourselves in a different situation than the ones we find ourselves in.  But clearly, I can imagine myself living in a fourteenth‐century medieval society.  But if this is possible, then what difficulty is there in imagining ourselves in a pre‐moral, pre‐social situation?     I must make clear that I am arguing for the impossibility of fully conceiving ourselves in a pre‐moral, pre‐social situation.  From this claim, 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however, it does not follow that we cannot conceive of our own existence in such a state.  It certainly is possible to imagine the essence of myself in a situation in which I have no contact with others, and no conception of constraint.  And such a person would indeed be partially recognizable as myself.  But this imagined person lacks the features necessary to make the decision that Gauthier asks us to make.  Gauthier makes the mistake of assuming that the essence of our selves are capable of possessing the desires relevant to the choice of constraints.  This is mistaken.   Our desires, however, are pieces of our individual stories.  As such, they cannot be considered in isolation from the network of roles, practices and constraints of which they are a part.  Let us suppose that Gauthier is correct in asserting that our essential selves are capable of possessing desires.  If this were the case, then it appears that at least some of our desires are an essential part of who we are.  It would also be true that these desires would be unchanging, since this is part of the meaning of an essential self.   But most of our desires do change.  Remember what your desires were like in your childhood.  Are any of those desires the same as your current desires?  Probably very few of your desires are the same as when you were a child.  This changing nature of our desires suggests that almost all of our desires develop, deepen, and alter throughout our lives.  They are not essential features of our selves.   It seems, then, that a better account of our desires is that they form a crucial piece of the story of our lives.  This claim accounts for the changing 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nature of our desires.  If we were to abstract away from the story of our lives, conceiving of only our essential selves, then it is difficult to imagine which desires (if any) we would have.  Now, suppose that there were some desires that remained as features of our essential selves.  How would we know them?  How could we distinguish which desires are the essential ones?  Since it is entirely unclear, therefore, which desires our essential self would possess, how is it that we can ask our essential self which constraints would be preferred by this essential self?  This is impossible.  Were this possible, a justification of constraint would be possible.  But such justification would come at the cost of our actual desires, which are a crucial part of our lives.  This justification, then, would remain irrelevant to our lives.   In short, fully imagining ourselves in a pre‐moral, pre‐social situation is impossible.  If it were possible, then our essential selves would possess desires.  They do not.  But even if they did, which constraints would be chosen by our essential self would be impossible to know, since it is entirely unclear which of our desires would belong to our essential selves.  In any case, then, Gauthier’s hypothetical agreement remains irrelevant to our lives. 2.4      In the next section, I will provide an argument that will serve as a challenge to Gauthier’s conclusion that self‐interest grounds our moral claims.  Moral rationalism is the view that morality is able to provide reasons for action.  If this view is correct, then morality is able, directly, to provide reasons for action.  If this is true, then it is difficult to see the need for 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the seeming unfairness of blaming persons for actions they had no reason to avoid.   Now, if moral rationalism is correct, then Gauthier’s deliberative justification seems implausible.  For deliberative justification affirms that morality does not provide reasons for actions.  The ultimate reason for performing any action, according to contractarians, is whether or not that action serves our self‐interest by maximizing our preference‐fulfillment.   So, is moral rationalism correct?  I will now seek to bolster Shafer‐Landau’s argument by considering an example.  Suppose that my friend Alison is asked to explain why she donated money to her favorite charity.  She explains that she did this because it was the right thing to do.  Suppose again, that she is not lying about this; this truly was her reason for acting.  If the rightness of donating her money in this way did not provide a reason for her to do it, then she would not be admired for doing it.  Suppose that instead of citing the rightness of donating as her reason, she said that she did it simply because she preferred to do it, given the circumstances.  It seems implausible to say that she would be admired for simply maximizing her preference‐fulfillment in this way.     Now suppose that Gauthier is correct in asserting that deliberative justification is the fundamental mode of how we reason practically.  If this were the case, then the rightness of donating would provide no reason for Alison to donate the money that she did.  Her reason for donating the money would then be simply because she preferred it.  Then, clearly, she would not 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be admired for simply doing what she preferred.  Likewise, if Alison were to steal money from her grandmother, she did this because she preferred it.  And, similarly, it is unlikely that stealing money in this way would be disapproved.  Clearly, this is both conceptually confused and unfair. 3.3     Let me consider a few objections.  The first objection to the claim that moral rationalism is true denies Shafer‐Landau’s claim that, were moral rationalism false, we would be left with affirming conceptually confused statements regarding the moral evaluation of an action.  Shafer‐Landau claims that to say, for example, that someone should be kind to his friends, while at the same time affirming that he has no reason to be kind to his friend is conceptually confused.  But we need not be confused, says this objector.  Perhaps, instead of affirming moral rationalism, we can evaluate an action from two perspectives:  from the point of view of reasons and from the point of view of morality.  So, from the point of view of morality, being kind to your friends is the right thing to do.  But from the point of view of reasons, if someone has no desire to be kind to her friends, then she has no reason to act in this manner.  We can affirm both statements without confusion.  So goes the objection.   If we deny moral rationalism in this way, however, the confusion would remain.  If we look at a case of extreme wrongdoing, it is clear that Shafer‐Landau’s argument is unaffected by this objection.  When we say that someone should not have sexually molested her own children, we are both 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can also identify many of our friends and family as a part of this tradition.  What can the moral rationalist say to these people?   It seems, of course, that there is a competing intuition that might also be strong; many people have no trace of moral skepticism at all.  Many of these same people simply comply with the moral practices of their society without question.  For these people, morality needs no justification.   These considerations suggest that perhaps we should say nothing to the moral skeptic.  Certainly, it is possible to argue that one moral code is superior to another.  But perhaps morality, on the whole, is such that no justification of it can be given.  Morality might simply be a crucial part of who we are, as humans.   I claimed at the beginning of this section there are two advantages that moral rationalism has over deliberative justification.  It avoids the implausible claim about moral evaluation discussed in Section 3.2.  But the second advantage is that it allows us to remain silent about the existence of objective values, which was one of Gauthier’s critiques of the older worldview.  Shafer‐Landau reminds us that questions about the ground of normativity are prevalent, and very difficult to answer.  He also admits that moral rationalism fares no better than other accounts in attempting to answer these questions.39  Perhaps these questions will always remain a feature of our inquiries into morality.  But by affirming moral rationalism, we 
                                                        39 Ibid.  p. 179. 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are able to simply assert that morality is able to provide reasons, without committing to whether or not moral claims are “objective,” or “subjective.”   Conclusion   In this paper, I have presented two arguments against David Gauthier’s contractarianism.  The first argument was as follows.     Gauthier’s hypothetical agreement is the object of a thought‐experiment wherein we are asked to consider which constraints we would prefer in a pre‐social, pre‐moral situation.  A consideration of constraints from this situation proves more stable, since it relates deeply to how we conceive of ourselves.  However, I have argued, that since roles, practices, and the constraints that sustain and partially define them are central to our self‐conception, the imagined person resulting from an abstraction of our social situations is sufficiently foreign to us so as to render the hypothetical agreement irrelevant to us.   The second argument was that since deliberative justification implies an implausible view about moral evaluation, it fails as a resolution to the foundational crisis.  Moral rationalism was presented as an alternative superior resolution.   I have sought to make plausible these claims in the hope of weakening the cumulative case for Gauthier’s contractarianism.  If I am correct in my claims, what does this mean?  If my claim that roles, practices and constraints are central to our self‐conception, and that the hypothetical agreement fails to attain any relevance to us, as actual beings, it seems that I have begun a 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sketch for a richer account of us as actual, moral beings.  This account begins from the plausible intuition that most of us conceive of ourselves as existing within a moral framework, and that this framework is interwoven into our self‐conception.     On this account, then, a justification of morality is not necessary.  Nor is this descriptive account intended (primarily) to provide any answer to the moral skeptic.  It may, however, perform these functions.  If this account is developed, the moral skeptic may perhaps come to see morality as basic to her own self‐conception, and may perhaps from this infer that she has a good reason to be moral.    Am I evading the question?  Is it part of the role of the moral philosopher to provide a justification of morality?  In Section 2, I argued that the interlocking network of roles, practices and constraints are central to our self‐conception.  If I am correct about this, and my recent comments are on target, then it seems that morality is simply a part of who we are.  Maybe this is all we can say on the matter.  After all, we must end our inquiries somewhere, just as the present paper has now ended. 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